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Over repeated reference conversational partners tend to converge on preferred terms
or referential pacts. Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are characterized by pragmatic
difficulties that are best captured by less structured tasks. To this end we tested adults
with ASD who did not have language or intellectual impairments, and neurotypical
comparison participants in a referential communication task. Participants were directors,
describing unlexicalized, complex novel stimuli over repeated rounds of interaction.
Group comparisons with respect to referential efficiency showed that directors with ASD
demonstrated typical lexical entrainment: they became faster over repeated rounds and
used shortened referential forms. ASD and neurotypical groups did not differ with respect
to the number of descriptors they provided or the number of exchanges needed for
matchers to identify figures. Despite these similarities the ASD group was slightly slower
overall. We examined partner-specific effects by manipulating the common ground
shared with the matcher. As expected, neurotypical directors maintained referential
precedents when speaking to the same matcher but not with a new matcher. Directors
with ASD were qualitatively similar but displayed a less pronounced distinction between
matchers. However, significant differences and different patterns of reference emerged
over time; neurotypical directors incorporated the new matcher’s contributions into
descriptions, whereas directors with ASD were less likely to do so.
Keywords: autism spectrum disorders, lexical entrainment, referential precedent, referential pact, partner-
specificity, common ground, audience design, language production
INTRODUCTION
Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) are a group of neurodevelopmental disorders or conditions
currently defined in the DSM-V by impairments in social communication and interaction alongside
the presence of restricted and repetitive patterns of behaviors and interests (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013). Perhaps the most noticeable communication difficulties people with ASD
experience revolve around initiating and maintaining reciprocal conversation, which requires a
host of pragmatic skills (Volden and Lord, 1991; Capps et al., 1998; de Villiers et al., 2007; Nadig
et al., 2010). In the 1980s Baron-Cohen and colleagues proposed a compelling explanation for these
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difficulties, centering on impaired theory of mind or the ability to
understand other’s mental states and understand that these can
differ from one’s own (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Baron-Cohen,
1989). This account was based on early reports of impaired or
even “absent” theory of mind in children with ASD and continues
to be highly influential, though primarily outside the field of
autism (cf. Klin et al., 1992; Frith andHappe, 1994; Mottron et al.,
2006, for discussion of the limitations of theory of mind as a
comprehensive account of autism).
In psycholinguistics the impaired theory of mind account
sparked considerable interest in examining pragmatic abilities in
ASD, often as a test case for models of reference that are rooted
in considerations of common ground or the informationmutually
known to interlocutors (e.g., Clark andMarshall, 1981; Clark and
Murphy, 1982; Clark, 1992). In particular, it is often hypothesized
that if an aspect of language use is thought to rely on referencing
another’s mental state (e.g., Does my conversational partner
know I call my computer “Titan” or do I need to refer to it as “my
computer”?), then people with ASD should not be able to do it in
a typical manner, or if they can, then this aspect of language use
does not rely on theory of mind. We hope to demonstrate why
this all or none approach is overly simplistic and unsubstantiated
by current empirical evidence. Consequently a more nuanced
view of the use of common ground in ASD is needed to inform
models of reference, just as a multifaceted view has evolved on
the use (Brown-Schmidt and Hanna, 2011) and representation
(Brown-Schmidt, 2012) of common ground in the neurotypical
population.
Although the impaired theory of mind account and
conventional expectations hold that people with ASD should
categorically lack sensitivity to common ground, research
exploring whether people with ASD are sensitive to their
conversational partner’s perspective paints a more complex and
gradient picture. Nadig et al. (2009) found that half of the
children with ASD they tested showed reduced sensitivity to
a partner’s visual perspective when producing descriptions for
objects that were either shared in common ground or visible
only to them, as is commonly expected. However, the other
half of children with ASD, who had higher formal language
abilities, were indistinguishable from their typical peers with
respect to reliance on common ground in this structured task.
In a narrative task, DE Marchena and Eigsti (2016) manipulated
common ground by having the listener share prior exposure (or
not) to cartoon clips that were later narrated by participants.
Their sample of adolescents with ASD showed sensitivity to
common ground, communicating differently in its presence on
a number of measures (explicit references of common ground,
disfluencies, and independent ratings of communicative quality).
Yet, while typically-developing adolescents showed a standard
referential shortening effect, producing fewer words in narratives
for listeners who shared exposure relative to those who did
not, adolescents with ASD did not show this effect as a group.
However, older ASD participants and those with better social
skills performed similarly to their typical peers on this more
open ended task. Taken together these findings demonstrate that
reliance on common ground by children and adolescents with
ASD is best viewed as delayed rather than absent, and that there
is significant variation among people with ASD. Many speakers
with ASD (who do not have language or intellectual impairment,
as in these studies) are aware of differences in their partner’s
perspective, but are less adroit in addressing discrepancies in
common ground in their spontaneous language use.
To date, one study has examined the negotiation of discrepant
common ground in adults with ASD. Begeer et al. (2010)
examined sensitivity to a partner’s visual perspective during the
comprehension of referential descriptions (employing a task
similar to that used by Nadig et al., 2009) and found nearly
identical performance between adults with and without ASD.
Given the findings from children and adolescents reported
above this is not surprising, as sensitivity to common ground
increases with age and/or formal language abilities in ASD.
Finally, Slocombe et al. (2013) used interactive tasks to investigate
the alignment of lexical choice, spatial frame, and syntactic
structure in adults with ASD without directly manipulating
common ground information. They hypothesized lexical choice
would involve audience design (Clark and Marshall, 1981) or the
tailoring of language to the knowledge or competence level of
a conversational partner to promote successful communication
(e.g., Bortfeld and Brennan, 1997; Branigan et al., 2011).
To examine lexical choice, Slocombe and colleagues used a
referential communication task where a confederate described
familiar pictures using rare names (e.g., chapel rather than
church), and then measured whether participants would “align”
with this uncommon name when later referring to the same
picture. Contrary to the authors’ predictions, they found that
adults with ASD (specifically Asperger’s Disorder using DSM-
IV criteria) were as likely as comparison participants to use the
uncommon name. They also aligned with their conversational
partners with respect to syntactic structure and spatial frame of
reference (Slocombe et al., 2013). In interpreting these findings,
both Begeer et al. (2010) and Slocombe et al. (2013) highlight
that the lack of group differences in their studies was likely
due to the nature of the tasks employed, which were highly
structured and goal-directed. There are a number of reasons
why performance would be enhanced in structured language
tasks vs. communication in real life. For one, the interaction is
more predictable and the problem space is limited, so it may
become easier to incorporate contextual information including a
partner’s perspective (Nadig et al., 2009). Begeer and colleagues
proposed that over arousal and a focus on local rather than
global processing that is observed in many individuals with ASD
could be “neutralized in structured social interaction” (Begeer
et al., 2010, p. 115). Importantly these authors (Nadig et al.,
2009; Begeer et al., 2010; Slocombe et al., 2013) emphasize that
audience-design effects from structured tasks are no less valid
as evidence of reliance common ground during communication,
but rather that structured tasks alleviate other factors and task
demands that may normally interfere with the effective use
of common ground in people with ASD. Nevertheless, these
findings suggest that more open-ended tasks are required to
capture difficulties with audience design that are commonly
encountered by adults with ASD in daily life.
The goal of the current study was two-fold. First, we examined
referential efficiency in the evolution of referential descriptions
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over multiple rounds of a communication game where directors,
adults with or without ASD matched on verbal IQ, refer to
novel tangram images (geometric shapes that are difficult to
describe) so that matchers can identify them from an array
of other tangrams (e.g., Krauss and Weinheimer, 1964, 1966;
Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Krauss, 1987; Schober and Clark,
1989). We know from prior work using similar methods that
referential efficiency improves over time through a process
of lexical entrainment (Garrod and Anderson, 1987) where a
preferred lexical form or referential pact (Brennan and Clark,
1996) is collaboratively agreed upon through proposals from the
director as well as back channel responses from the matcher. To
our knowledge the collaborative construction of novel referential
terms has not previously been investigated in ASD. Though
such a communication game is structured by definition, we view
ours as a more open-ended task than those used previously
due to a combination of factors: we examine the participant’s
open-ended production rather than comprehension of scripted
instructions, stimuli is novel and unlexicalized, consequently it
is difficult to describe and there is no closed set of options to
choose from (e.g., common vs. rare), we investigate the evolution
of descriptions over repeated rounds of reference, and finally
we include an experimental manipulation (described below) to
assess the impact of a change in partner, disturbing the structure
that had been established. To examine participants’ ability to
entrain over time we analyze the duration of repeated rounds
of the game with the same set of stimuli. We also investigate
the number of descriptors (defined in Section Data Coding)
directors produce when describing tangram stimuli, as well as
the number of exchanges between director and matcher until the
matcher is able to identify the target referent. Speakers with ASD
are known to have difficulty providing the appropriate level of
information for a given communicative situation, being over- or
under-informative in different circumstances (cf. Volden et al.,
1997; Dahlgren and Sandberg, 2008; Nadig et al., 2009), and to be
stereotyped in their language use (Philofsky et al., 2007), which
may make them less efficient in this collaborative task. However,
previous data from adults with ASD without intellectual or
language impairment, similar to our sample, demonstrates that
lexical alignment is intact in this group (Slocombe et al., 2013).
Therefore, we predicted few if any differences on measures of
referential efficiency.
Second, we investigated the partner-specificity of any
referential pacts established by manipulating the experience
and thus the common ground shared with the matcher.
Critically, in interactive settings (cf. Brown-Schmidt, 2009)
lexical entrainment has been shown to be partner-specific. After
conversational partners develop a referential pact, if a new
partner who was not involved in entrainment is introduced,
the entrained term is less likely to be maintained by directors
(Brennan and Clark, 1996) or expected by matchers (Metzing
and Brennan, 2003; Brown-Schmidt, 2009). Recent work with
typically-developing children shows that children as young as 4
years old maintain referential precedents with their peers in a
partner–specific manner (Köymen et al., 2014) and that 3- and 4-
year-olds expect adult speakers tomaintain referential precedents
in a partner–specific manner (Matthews et al., 2010; Graham
et al., 2014). The mechanisms underlying the comprehension of
referential precedents is an area of active debate, at the heart
of which is whether high-level common ground inferences or
low-level memory mechanisms (episodic priming and encoding
cues) best explain the effects (Brennan and Hanna, 2009; Brown-
Schmidt, 2009; Shintel and Keysar, 2009; Kronmüller and Barr,
2015). The task we use stands somewhat outside this debate as it is
a production task, and prior work on production used a different
paradigm with familiar objects with known names rather than
tangram stimuli (Brennan and Clark, 1996; Köymen et al., 2014).
We view our task, where participants as directors need to create
agreed upon terms for complex novel stimuli through interaction
with a matcher, as one that inherently requires collaboration.
Therefore, if partner-specific effects are found, they are likely to
follow from considerations of whether a referential precedent is
shared in common ground with a specific matcher or not, a point
that will be returned to in the discussion.
We analyzed partner-specific effects by comparing expected
differences across conditions in the duration of Round 1 vs.
Round 4, where the new matcher was introduced in the new
condition but the same matcher continued the game in the
same condition. For a more precise measure of how directors
may adapt descriptions to a new matcher, we examined the
maintenance of the referential precedent from the prior round
on critical Round 4 in the same vs. new conditions, as well as
how they continued to interact with the matcher on Round 5,
the end of the game with a given set of cards. Finally we explored
whether these two variables were related on critical Round 4: Is
the duration difference, which was expected to be a delay in the
presence of a newmatcher, related to whether directors continued
to maintain the referential precedent or not? We predicted
that neurotypical directors would maintain pacts with the same
matcher but elaborate on the referential precedent or chose a
different term when speaking to a new matcher, consistent with
prior findings. When it comes to the ASD group, a staunch
impaired theory of mind account would predict that they would
show no difference between same and new matcher conditions,
continuing to use the same descriptions regardless of differences
in the common ground shared with their listener. However,
given the findings reviewed above showing basic sensitivity to
discrepancies in common ground in ASD, we expect this group
to show some sensitivity to the change in partner but in a less
pronounced way than the neurotypical group.
Finally, to obtain a direct measure of the collaborative
nature of lexical entrainment (Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986) we
examined how likely directors were to incorporate the matcher’s
proposals (when provided) for how to describe the figure. We
predicted that matchers would suggest more descriptors on early
rounds of discussing a figure, before a referential pact was
established. We expected that participants with ASD may be less
likely to engage in this collaborative behavior.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Thirteen adults with ASD and 13 neurotypical adults (NT; from
the general population with no known developmental disorders)
were included in the sample. An additional 4 ASD participants
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were tested, but no video record of their sessions was available
for analysis due to experimenter error. An additional 18 NT
participants were tested but only those who could be closely
matched to each of the ASD participants are included here.
Participants with ASD were participating in a larger transition
support service for young adults with ASD and were recruited
through advertisements posted at local autism organizations,
college offices for students with disabilities, and social service
providers. The NT comparison participated in a longer 2 h
testing protocol including the referential communication task
presented here. They were recruited either through a psychology
department subject pool, receiving partial course credit for
participation, or through word of mouth and advertisements
in the community, receiving $10 for participation. This study
received ethics approval from the University of McGill Faculty
of Medicine Institutional Review Board. All participants gave
written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki.
Participants ranged from 18 to 29 years old; age did not differ
significantly different between groups [ASD: M = 22 years 2
months, SD = 4 years 2 months, NT: M = 21 years 2 months,
SD = 11 months, t(1, 24) = 0.90, p = 0.38, r = 0.17]. Gender
proportion was also similar across groups (ASD: 7 males, 6
females, NT: 5 males, 8 females, χ2 = 0.62, p = 0.43, ϕ = 0.15).
To ensure the groups had similar verbal abilities, allowing for
comparison of pragmatic abilities specifically on the referential
communication task, they were administered the verbal subtests
(Vocabulary and Similarities) of the Wechsler Abbreviated Sale
of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 2008) to obtain a measure of
verbal IQ. Groups did not differ significantly with respect to
verbal IQ [ASD: M = 113, SD = 10, NT: M = 115, SD = 9,
t(1, 24) = 0.53, p = 0.60, r = 0.10]. All but two participants (one
from each group) were native speakers of English. Those who
were not native speakers had been using English their daily life
for 10 years or more and had completed secondary or university
education in English, moreover they scored in the average range
or higher on an English test of verbal IQ.
Community diagnoses of ASD were confirmed in our study
by administration of the ADOS-2 module 4 (Lord et al., 2012),
using the revised algorithm for module 4 (Hus and Lord, 2014)
or, when possible, parent report of early autism symptoms using
the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ, Rutter et al.,
2003). Nine of 13 ASD participants met ASD criteria (i.e., scores
of 8 or higher, M = 13, range = 8–23) on the ADOS-2 based
on current functioning and the remaining four participants met
criteria for ASD based on their early development, as reported by
their parent on the SCQ (i.e., scores of 15 or higher), but fell short
of meeting ADOS-2 criteria based on current functioning (having
ADOS-2 scores from 5 to 7). Prior to the lab visit, participants
in the NT group completed a demographic questionnaire
asking if they had ever been diagnosed with a developmental
disorder, and whether they had a first or second degree
relative with ASD; potential NT participants meeting either
of these criteria were excluded. Of potential NT participants
who completed the questionnaire, two were excluded from
participation.
Materials
Eighteen tangram figures were printed in black ink on white
cardstock. Two sets of nine stimuli were used, one set resembled
animals (Set A), and the second resembled people (Set B), see
Figure 1. Cards were laminated and two copies were made of
each card to have identical sets for the director and matcher. Two
easel boards with a 3 by 3 numbered grid marked on them were
used to present the stimuli. Velcro in each square of the grid and
on the back of each card allowed the cards to be attached and
removed from the easel.
Procedure
We employed a collaborative referential communication
game to assess production, incorporating elements from two
previous lines of research: spontaneous lexical entrainment while
describing complex novel stimuli (Krauss and Glucksberg, 1969;
Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986), and manipulation of the same
vs. new partner when studying the use of referential precedents
in interactive tasks (Brennan and Clark, 1996, Experiment 3;
Metzing and Brennan, 2003; Brown-Schmidt, 2009).
Participants always played the role of director, describing
tangram stimuli to an experimental confederate who acted as
the matcher. To measure partner specific effects two different
matchers (original or same and new) were introduced in the new
matcher condition, details provided below. An experimenter who
conducted the longer testing session introduced the participant to
the same matcher, who was presented as a lab member who had
been called to help with this particular task. The experimenter
explained the task to the director and the same matcher
concurrently, assuming no familiarity with the task. Matchers
were undergraduate or graduate student research assistants, or
FIGURE 1 | Tangram stimuli used in our task, Set A (top row) and Set B (bottom row). Each set was used for one condition (same vs. new matcher).
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in rare cases a faculty member if assistants were not available to
fill all roles. For the sample reported here, in total 8 confederates
played the role of the same matcher (median number of times
playing this role = 4) and 10 confederates played the role of the
new matcher (median number of times playing this role = 2.5).
Matchers were instructed to respond naturally in the game and
to ask for more information as required to complete the task. As
the majority of matchers played the task only a few times over
many months, and that the initial descriptions for each figure
varied greatly across directors, the stimuli remained relatively
new to them.
The director and matcher were seated across from each other
at a table, each with a large easel in front of them so that
neither could see the other person nor what was displayed on
his/her easel. The experimenter (E), who conducted the longer
session, introduced the task and how it was played, and was
responsible for placing and removing stimuli cards and operating
a videocamera. Before each round, E placed nine cards on the
director’s easel in a random order. E explained to both the
director and matcher that she would put nine cards up on the
easel, and that the matcher had an identical set of cards on the
table in front of her. The director’s task was to describe the
cards in sequence (squares 1–9 were indicated on the board)
so the matcher could place her cards to match the director’s
display. Three practice cards were used to familiarize dyads with
the task. During the practice round it was reinforced that the
director should move in order from square one to nine, that
the matcher could ask questions at any time for clarification,
and that the matcher should say “okay” or “got it” when she
located the correct card as the director would not be able to see
this.
Ten rounds of this game were played in total: five rounds with
a given set of cards for each of the two experimental conditions
(same matcher vs. new matcher). The director described nine
cards, in sequence, on each round. At the end of the round, E
shuﬄed the cards and placed them up on the director’s easel in a
random order, starting the next round.
The matcher’s knowledge of referential precedents was
manipulated as follows. In the same matcher condition, the
director described the cards to the samematcher for three rounds.
At this point the matcher said she forgot to tell her friend
something next door and left. She returned after a minute, the
game continued for rounds 4 and 5 with the samematcher.
In the new matcher condition the director also played the
game with the same matcher for rounds 1–3. However, this
time the same matcher said that she really needed to go to the
bathroom and that her friend could step in for her. The same
matcher left and the new matcher came in a minute later. E
quickly introduced the new matcher to the game and its rules,
and rounds 4 and 5 were played with the newmatcher. Thus, the
new matcher was also presented as a lab member, but one who
was naïve to the game; the Experimenter introduced the game to
this newmatcher as if she had no prior knowledge of it.
A different set of cards (A or B in Figure 1) was used
for each condition. Card set and order of condition were
counterbalanced within each group by assigning each subsequent
participant tested to one of four orders (e.g., Set A or Set B
first, same or new condition first). Given an uneven sample
size (13 in each group) and that more participants were
tested than those included in the final sample, this resulted
in card set and condition not being fully balanced. In the
same matcher condition 8/13ASD participants and 7/13 NT
participants received Set A, with the remaining receiving Set B;
the opposite card set was used in the new matcher condition.
For both ASD and NT groups 5/13 participants had the same
matcher condition first, the remaining 8 had the new matcher
condition first.
Data Coding
Data was transcribed from video recordings of the task. The
duration of each round was recorded while transcribing. Tangram
descriptions were divided into descriptors, defined as any noun
ormodifier describing the figure as a whole. Adjectivesmodifying
a part of the figure were not counted as their own descriptor.
For example, “the skater with his left leg stretched out and a
diamond head” was coded as three initial descriptors: skater;
left leg stretched out; diamond head. In this case, left was
not considered a separate descriptor because it describes leg
and not the skater. The number of exchanges or turns between
director and matcher when working on a figure, from the initial
description until the matcher located the card, were also coded.
An exchange was defined as one description by the director, and
one verbal response by the matcher. The response by the matcher
could be a question or statement, or a confirmation (“Okay, got
it” or “uh huh,” participants were told during practice that they
should confirm in this fashion since their partner could not see
when he/she found the card).
Relation to the referential precedent of the prior round was
coded into one of four categories. In doing so, determiners,
prepositions and other function words were excluded when
determining informational equivalence; thus “the lady who
is walking” was considered equivalent to “walking lady”
(Brennan et al., 2013). The same category was used when two
descriptions were informationally equivalent. Same-simplified
refers to descriptions that maintained the conceptualization of
the previous round, but used fewer descriptors as is typical in
lexical entrainment, apparently because fewer were needed when
a referential pact had been established. For instance:
Round 1: Director: The waiter with the triangle tray, facing
right
Round 2: D: The waiter with the tray
Round 3: D: The waiter
Round 4: D: Waiter
Round 5: D: Waiter
In this example the description categories on Rounds 2 and
3 (with respect to the prior round) were same-simplified and
description categories for Rounds 4 and 5 were same.
Sometimes directors would use the same conceptualization
but add additional information or descriptors. This was coded
as same-expanded. For example:
Round 1: D: The sad dog
Round 2: D: The sad dog, facing left
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Occasionally the director would offer a conceptualizations
that was completely different from the prior round, these were
coded as different.
Round 1: D: The bird facing left with two triangle feet
Round 2: D: The giraffe
Incorporation of matcher’s descriptors was coded as direct
measure of the collaborative nature of lexical entrainment (Clark
and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). For each of the 9 cards described and
entrained upon in each condition (same or new matcher), how
the director handled the matcher’s spontaneous contributions
regarding how to describe the figure were coded as follows: yes
(matcher’s descriptor incorporated by director on a subsequent
round), no (no incorporation of descriptors suggested by
matcher), or N/A (matcher did not propose any descriptors).
This code was assigned at two time points for each card: for
exchanges through the end of Round 3 (which always involved
the same matcher in both conditions), and again for those from
Round 4 through 5 (which involved a change in matcher in the
new matcher condition). For instance, the following exchange
in the new matcher condition received the code of yes for the
Round 4 through 5 incorporation variable. It should be noted
that this variable is likely affected by unmeasured differences
with respect to the matcher’s contributions (e.g., how plausible
they were as descriptors, whether they offered a contrasting
conceptualization or followed the director’s conceptualization),
since many confederates played the role of matcher and
their only direction was to respond naturally to complete the
task.
Participant 117
Round 4
Director: a four legged or two legged animal facing the right
The head is a parallelogram and its back leg is a rectangle and
the front legs look like paws
New Matcher: does it look like an elephant if the
parallelogram is a trunk?
Director: yeah, it does look like an elephant
Round 5
Director: an elephant facing right
Coding Reliability
A coding system was developed by the authors over multiple
iterations of trying to capture the construct of referential
precedent in the current production corpus involving the
description of complex novel stimuli (as opposed to familiar
basic and subordinate level terms, e.g., shoe and penny loafer,
Brennan and Clark, 1996). The second author trained two
additional undergraduate students, who were blind to the design
and hypotheses of the study as well as group membership,
on the final coding system via discussions and work on two
training files until they reached consensus in their coding.
Across variables, 20–33% of the participants in each group were
double coded to calculate inter-coder reliability. For number of
initial descriptors, correlations indicated very high agreement
between both additional coders (r = 0.96 and 0.99) and the
second author. Number of exchanges was calculated by an excel
formula based on the cells where each director description
and matcher response or question were entered in sequence.
Reliability on referential precedent categories was measured by
Cohen’s unweighted kappa, which was reasonably high between
each of the additional coders (Kappa = 0.90 and 0.78) and the
second author. Finally, reliability for Incorporation of matcher’s
descriptors was obtained between the third author and an
undergraduate student blind to study hypotheses and group
membership. Cohen’s unweighted kappa a was very high for
incorporation by Round 3 (Kappa = 0.92) as well as by Round
5 (Kappa= 0.98).
RESULTS
Effect size is provided for each contrast using r for pairwise
comparisons, for which a small effect is defined as 0.1, a medium
effect is 0.3 and a large effect is 0.5, and with partial eta squared η2p
for ANOVA effects, which reflects the portion of unique variance
on the dependent variable that is explained by the independent
variable.
Referential Efficiency1
Round Duration
For a global analysis of whether lexical entrainment took place
over the 5 rounds of each condition, we submitted data on round
duration in seconds to amixed ANOVAwith round (1 through 5)
and condition (same or newmatcher) as within-subjects variables
and group (ASD vs. NT) as a between subjects variable. As seen
in Figure 2, there were strong main effects of round, F(4, 96) =
75.12, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.76, and of condition, F(1, 24) = 14.15,
p = 0.001, η2p = 0.37. There was also a significant effect of group,
F(1, 24) = 7.76, p = 0.01, η
2
p = 0.24. This was due to the ASD
group having a higher average round duration (141 s) relative to
the NT group (105 s) with a small effect size, t(1, 234.12) = 2.89,
p < 0.001, r = 0.18. There was a significant interaction between
round and condition, F(4, 96) = 27.10, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.53. No
other interactions were significant.
Remaining variables were averaged over the rounds of each
condition and were analyzed using mixed repeated-measures
ANOVAs with condition (same or new matcher) as a within-
subjects factor and group (ASD, NT) as a between subjects
factor.
Initial Number of Descriptors Per Figure
There was a significant main effect of condition (same vs. new
matcher), F(1, 24) = 9.34, p = 0.005, η
2
p = 0.28. There was not
a main effect of group, F(1, 24) = 0.49, p = 0.51, η
2
p = 0.02.
Finally, there was no interaction between group and condition,
F(1, 24) = 0.18, p = 0.70, η
2
p = 0.01. The NT group increased
1Variables presented here are considered to be constructs measuring referential
efficiency (especially in the same matcher condition). However, given the partner
manipulation in the experimental design, effects of condition (where differences
are observed between same and new matcher) are best viewed as partner-specific
effects that arose in Rounds 4 and 5 post partner switch.
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FIGURE 2 | The top panel shows the same matcher condition, where dyads in both groups get much faster over 5 rounds of discussing the figures,
reflecting lexical entrainment. Results differ however in the new matcher condition in the bottom panel, where dyads in both groups show a disruption
of lexical entrainment when a new matcher is introduced on the fourth round. Gray dots indicate jittered data points, black dots indicate outliers.
from a mean of 2.15 descriptors when speaking to the same
matcher to 2.56 descriptors when speaking to the new matcher.
The ASD group also increased across conditions, from a mean
of 2.22 descriptors when speaking to the same matcher to 2.74
descriptors with the newmatcher.
Number of Exchanges Per Round
There was a significant main effect of condition (same vs. new
matcher), F(1, 24) = 11.13, p = 0.003, η
2
p = 0.32. Again there
was no a main effect of group, F(1, 24) = 1.13, p = 0.30,
η
2
p = 0.05. Finally, there was no interaction between group and
condition, F(1, 24) = 0.60, p = 0.45, η
2
p = 0.02. Figure 3 shows
that the NT group increased from a mean of 1.32 turns when
speaking to the same matcher to 1.53 turns when speaking to
the new matcher. The ASD group also increased, from a mean
of 1.45 turns with the same matcher to 1.59 turns with the new
matcher.
Partner-Specific Adaptation
Round 4 was the critical point in the experiment; it was the
first round after the original matcher left the room momentarily
and returned in the same condition, or was replaced in the new
matcher condition. We predicted that audience design effects
would be seen most prominently at this point in the NT group.
We predicted the ASD group would respond in a qualitatively
similar way, showing some sensitivity to the change in matcher,
but that they would smaller differences between the same and new
matcher conditions than the neurotypical group.
Difference in Duration of Round 1 vs. 4
Through the process of lexical entrainment conversational
partners typically speed up over repeated references to the
same entity. To measure the extent to which the new matcher
disrupted this process, controlling for baseline description speed,
we calculated a difference score: duration of Round 1minus the
duration of Round 4, which is positive when dyads get faster
over time. As would be expected from Figure 2 above, there was
a significant main effect of condition (same vs. new matcher),
F(1, 24) = 38.48, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.62. As for other variables,
there was no main effect of group F(1, 24) = 0.02, p = 0.88, η
2
p =
0.00. However, there was a marginally significant interaction
between group and condition, F(1, 24) = 3.88, p = 0.06, η
2
p =
0.14. The NT group went from a mean decrease of 162 s when
speaking to the same matcher to only 46 s when speaking to the
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FIGURE 3 | Average number of exchanges required for the matcher to
locate the figure, by condition and group.
newmatcher. The ASD group went from amean decrease of 221 s
when speaking with the same matcher to an increase of 2 s with
the newmatcher. This pattern is depicted in Figure 4.
Maintenance of Referential Pact on Round 4
We predicted that on Round 4 directors in both groups would
maintain the referential pact they had been using with the same
matcher, that is, repeat the referential precedent or use a reduced
form of it. For the new matcher we predicted that the NT
group would spontaneously engage in audience design for the
new matcher, who did not share knowledge of the referential
precedent, by elaborating on it or using a different lexicalization.
Finally, we predicted the ASD group would show less sensitivity
to the new matcher by being more likely to maintain the
referential pact they had established with the original matcher.
Figure 5 shows a complete tally of the types of descriptions given
on critical Round 4 in relation to Round 3 descriptions.
Our analysis focused on maintenance of the referential
precedent (including same-simplified and same descriptions).
There was a significant main effect of condition (same vs. new
matcher), F(1, 24) = 68.46, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.74. Once
again there was no main effect of group, F(1, 24) = 1.61, p =
0.22, η2p = 0.06. There was, however, a marginally significant
interaction between group and condition, F(1, 24) = 3.21, p =
0.08, η2p = 0.12. We followed this up with a planned comparison
between groups in the new matcher condition specifically. In
line with our prediction, the ASD group were marginally more
likely to maintain the referential pact than the NT group, with
a medium effect size, t(1, 24) = 2.03, p = 0.05, r = 0.37. At
FIGURE 4 | Difference in duration of Round 1 vs. Round 4, where the
new matcher switch occurred, by condition and group. Positive values
indicate speeding up over four rounds of referring to the same figures, and a 0
duration difference indicates taking the same time on Round 4 as on the first
presentation of the cards on Round 1.
the individual level, all 13 NT directors maintained 3 or fewer
referential precedents on Round 4 with the new matcher, while
9/13 directors with ASD displayed the same pattern, but the
remaining 4 maintained 4–8 referential precedents. As seen in
Figure 6 the NT group showed an extreme difference between
conditions, maintaining referential precedents for a mean of 7
out of 9 figures when speaking to the same matcher, but only for
1.38 figures when speaking to a new matcher. The ASD group
was less pronounced in this distinction, decreasing from a mean
of 6.53 referential precedents maintained with the same matcher
to 2.92 maintained with newmatchers.
We also examined if Round 1minus Round 4 duration
difference was related to maintaining the referential pact
on Round 4 in the new matcher condition specifically. We
reasoned that that maintaining the referential precedent on this
round may slow the dyad’s interaction, since the new matcher
lacked knowledge of the referential precedent. Consequently
we expected that greater maintenance of referential precedents
would be inversely related to duration difference (where positive
values indicate speeding up). Results are shown in Figure 7. The
correlation in the NT group was in the direction of our prediction
but did not reach significance (r = −0.20, p = 0.37), likely
because there was little variation in maintaining the precedent
when speaking to the new matcher. There was a significant
correlation in the ASD group (r = 0.52, p = 0.02), but in the
opposite direction of our prediction. In fact, in cases where ASD
participants maintained more precedents with the new matcher,
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FIGURE 5 | Types of descriptions, with respect to the referential precedent of the prior round, given on critical Round 4 to the same matcher (left) vs.
new matcher (right).
dyads got through Round 4 more quickly. Conversely, in cases
where ASD directors tended not to maintain precedents with the
new matcher, as NT directors did, dyads actually took longer to
complete Round 4. Our interpretation of this finding is that it
took ASD directors more time to adapt to the newmatcher in the
manner that NT directors did (by elaborating on the referential
precedent or using a different term). It is also possible that the
new matchers’ responses contributed to this longer duration,
however, since the new matcher had just started playing the
game, and there were no group differences in referential efficiency
measures on the part of the director, it is unlikely that matchers
had a basis on which to respond differently to ASD vs. NT
directors.
Maintenance of Referential Pact on Round 5
To examine how entrainment would unfold in the presence of
the new matcher we also examined maintenance of referential
pacts from Round 4 on Round 5. There was a significant main
effect of condition (same vs. new matcher) F(1, 24) = 27.13,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.53. Again there was no main effect of group,
F(1, 24) = 0.14, p = 0.71, η
2
p = 0.01. Importantly, there was a
significant interaction between group and condition, F(1, 24) =
4.98, p = 0.03, η2p = 0.17. Figure 8 shows that the NT group
maintained their referential precedent on the last round of the
game for a mean of 7.92 of 9 figures with the same matcher, but
for 5.23 figures when speaking to a newmatcher. The ASD group
was less divergent between conditions, decreasing from a mean
of 7.30 referential precedents maintained with the same matcher
to 6.23 maintained with newmatchers.
Incorporation of Matcher Descriptors
This was a direct measure of how collaborative entrainment was,
that is, whether directors incorporated descriptors suggested by
the matcher on a subsequent round. Results are provided in
Table 1 below. The majority of data was missing for the same
FIGURE 6 | Maintenance of referential precedent from Round 3 on
Round 4, by condition and group.
matcher condition, Round 4 through 5 because an entrained term
was generally set and the same matcher tended not to suggest
descriptors at this point, giving no opportunity for incorporation.
Given this, analyses focused on the new matcher condition,
which reflects partner-specific changes. A mixed ANOVA was
conducted with subjects factor of time point (by end of Round
3, Round 4 through 5) and the between subjects factor of group.
The effect of time point was not significant F(1, 22) = 1.83,
p = 0.19, η2p = 0.08. There was however a significant main effect
of group, F(1, 22) = 4.97, p = 0.04, η
2
p = 0.18. This was due
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FIGURE 7 | Relation between maintenance of referential precedent on
Round 4 with new matcher and the duration difference between Round
1 and Round 4 (positive values indicate speeding up over repeated reference).
to the ASD group having a reduced tendency to incorporate the
matcher’s contributions (0.31) relative to the NT group (0.48).
There was also a marginal interaction between group and time
point, F(1,22) = 3.92, p = 0.06, η
2
p = 0.15. As seen in Table 1,
this reflected the fact that, while the groups were similar in
their incorporation of the matcher’s descriptors when interacting
with the original matcher until round 3, the ASD group became
markedly less likely to do so than the NT group when interacting
with the newmatcher on rounds 4 through 5.
DISCUSSION
Our first set of findings on referential efficiency indicate that
adults with ASD, who did not have language or intellectual
impairment, were similar to a neurotypical comparison group
with respect to the initial number of descriptors they used when
describing tangram figures, and in the number of exchanges
required for a matcher to find the figure they described. They
also displayed the typical duration effect observed in lexical
entrainment, becoming faster over time, to the same extent
as the neurotypical group. These findings indicate that ASD
group did entrain on lexical terms in this relatively open-
ended task, rather than, for example, perseverating on the
same description over five rounds. However, these similarities
were observed in the presence of a global delay in completing
the game: when directors were adults with ASD the game
took significantly longer (on average 36 s longer per round)
than when directors were neurotypical adults. This may have
been due to differences in variables that we did not measure
directly, for example the time taken to formulate descriptions
of these complex novel figures, disfluencies when producing the
descriptions, and/or the content of the description that may have
FIGURE 8 | Maintenance of referential precedent from Round 4 on
Round 5, by condition and group. Note: The NT group displayed little
variability, with an interquartile range of 1 that was too small to appear in this
boxplot.
led to the matcher to respond more slowly although there was
no difference in the number of exchanges between director and
matcher.
Our second set of findings focused on potential partner-
specific effects in round duration and the maintenance of
referential precedents. The pattern of results in the neurotypical
group showed clear partner-specific effects, where round
duration increased dramatically on Round 4 when the new
matcher was introduced relative to when continuing with the
same matcher. Interestingly, results from the ASD group belie
a strong impaired theory of mind account which would predict
no difference in round duration across matcher conditions.
In fact, the ASD group showed the same condition effect as
the neurotypical group, being delayed when the new matcher
was introduced. Furthermore, there was a marginal interaction
indicating that the ASD group had a tendency to be even
more delayed by the change in matcher, rather than less
delayed as we had expected. With respect to the maintenance of
referential precedents, the neurotypical group exhibited robust
partner-specific effects again, switching from maintaining the
precedent almost all of the time with the same matcher to
very rarely with the new matcher. The ASD group displayed
a similar but less pronounced pattern, and were marginally
more likely to continue to maintain precedents in critical
Round 4 when interacting with a new matcher. We also
found a counterintuitive correlation in the ASD group between
maintenance of precedents on Round 4 when speaking to
the new matcher and on duration difference: for those ASD
participants who rarely maintained precedents (behaving like the
neurotypical group), Round 4 trial duration was significantly
longer, leading to negative difference scores. We suggest that
this may reflect the effort required by directors with ASD
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TABLE 1 | Incorporation of matcher’s descriptors by condition, group and time point.
Same matcher New matcher
ASD NT ASD NT
By end of round 3 Participants for whom the matcher suggested descriptors 100% (n = 13) 92.3% (n = 12) 100%(n = 13) 100% (n = 13)
Proportion of the time directors incorporated matcher descriptorsM (SD) 0.53 (0.38) 0.53 (0.32) 0.44 (0.31) 0.46 (0.25)
Round 4 through 5 Participants for whom the matcher suggested descriptors 38.5% (n = 5) 15.4% (n = 2) 84.6% (n = 11) 100% (n = 13)
Proportion of the time directors incorporated matcher descriptorsM (SD) 0.20 (0.18) 0.50 (0.70) 0.18 (0.19) 0.50 (0.27)
Red indicates cells where data is unreliable because the majority of data was missing.
to take the new matcher’s common ground into account
and formulate a more elaborated description as opposed to
maintaining the referential precedent they had established with
the original, same matcher. Importantly, these trends toward
differences between groups on Round 4 were amplified on
Round 5, where there was a significant interaction whereby the
ASD group maintained referential precedents more often than
the neurotypical (NT) group when interacting with the new
matcher.
Data on the Incorporation of matcher’s descriptors in the new
matcher condition allows us to better understand the nature of
this effect. Incorporation of descriptors offered by the matcher
occurred close to half of the time when working with the first
matcher on Rounds 1 to 3, among both NT participants and
ASD participants. Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986) proposed that
when a director feels that the matcher is lacking information, he
or she may choose to expand their description prior to being
prompted to do so. Directors in our study, whether they were
NT or had ASD, did so to a similar degree, incorporating new
partner-specific descriptors given feedback that that the previous
description was inadequate for the new matcher. This indicates
another similarity in partner-specific effects.
However, a significant group difference emerged when the
last two rounds of the new matcher condition were considered.
This is the point where the first partner who was involved in
lexical entrainment was replaced by a new partner who was
viewing the tangrams for the first time. Analyses revealed that
NT participants often gave elaborated descriptions on Round
4 when speaking to a new matcher (reflecting partner-specific
adaptation). In addition, through Round 5, NT directors
continued to incorporate terms suggested by the matcher half of
the time on average, as they had on earlier rounds with the first
matcher. In some cases they abandoned their initial formulation,
producing a collaborative referential pact, as in this example,
repeated from the methods section:
Participant 117
Round 4
Director: a four legged or two legged animal facing the right
The head is a parallelogram and its back leg is a rectangle and
the front legs look like paws
New Matcher: does it look like an elephant if the
parallelogram is a trunk?
Director: yeah, it does look like an elephant
Round 5
Director: an elephant facing right
Consequently the director in this example did not maintain
a referential precedent on Round 5. Sometimes, NT directors did
not fully revise their description in favor of a distinct term offered
by the matcher, but they added terms the matcher suggested into
a collaborative referential pact and the Round 5 description was
categorized as same-expanded, for instance:
Participant 124
Round 3
(with SameMatcher)
Director: lady sitting
Round 4
Director: one where the lady is sitting
NewMatcher: sitting on a regular box?
Director: yes
Round 5
Director: the lady sitting on a box
In contrast, ASD participants were less likely to incorporate
information offered by the new matcher (18% of the time) on
Rounds 4 through 5. Instead, ASD participants tended to use
the same descriptors they had on Round 4, or a simplification
thereof. For example:
Participant 1333
Round 4
Director: an arrow as a head
New Matcher: is the top a square and then an upside down
triangle?
Director: yeah
Round 5
Director: an arrow as a head
NewMatcher: and one foot is in the air?
Director: yeah
Participant 1330
Round 4
Director: reading
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NewMatcher: someone’s reading?
Director:mmhmm
NewMatcher: is he upside down?
Director: no it has a triangle on top
NewMatcher: are there two shapes on either side that are the
same? and each of the shapes have 5 sides?
Director: no someone reading facing to the left with a
diamond
Round 5
Director: the one reading a book
These different patterns of incorporating new matcher
perspectives on Rounds 4 through 5 in the case of NT
directors, and a significantly decreased likelihood to do so by
directors with ASD, likely gave rise to the significant interaction
for maintenance of a referential pact on Round 5. Yet the
groups did not differ with respect to incorporation of the same
matcher’s descriptors on earlier Rounds 1–3. Taken together,
these findings demonstrate that adults with ASD do initially
incorporate a partner’s suggestions to the same degree as NT
peers in the context of this task, which once again runs counter
to an impaired theory of mind account. However, once a
conceptualization and referential precedent has been established
(in a collaborative manner), directors with ASD were less flexible
in modifying the entrained upon term to accommodate the
new matcher. Parallel findings were reported by Hala et al.
(2007) who found that participants with ASD exhibited normal
semantic priming of homographs in a first round of exposure,
but not when a prime for the second meaning of the homograph
was presented subsequently. Such findings can be explained
by difficulties with inhibition or interference control in ASD
(e.g., Geurts et al., 2014). Crucially, this is another example of
communicative disruption in ASD, customarily attributed to
theory of mind impairment, which actually follows from non-
social difficulties (e.g., Nadig et al., 2010, where perseverative,
self-contingent utterances in conversation were related to
restricted and repetitive interest symptoms rather than social
skills).
In summary, the adults with ASD in our study displayed
largely typical effects of lexical entrainment in a collaborative
game requiring them to develop referential descriptions for
unlexicalized stimuli, but they took more time to do so than
did neurotypical participants matched on verbal IQ. When their
partner in the game changed to a new matcher, directors with
ASD were sensitive to this change as a group, switching from
maintaining referential precedentsmost of the timewith the same
matcher to significantly less often with the newmatcher.
However, much more variability in making this switch was
observed in the ASD than the neurotypical groups, leading to a
marginal interaction with a medium effect size. Those directors
with ASD who followed the neurotypical pattern of partner-
specific adaptation in referential descriptions took significantly
longer to complete the round with their partner, suggesting
that this adaptation was effortful for them. This was coupled
with a significant group difference in incorporating information
proposed by the matcher, specifically by the new matcher at the
end of the game. Neurotypical directors often added elements
suggested by the newmatcher, directors with ASD were resistant
to do so at this point when a referential precedent was already
established. Potentially due to this, on the last round of the
game there was a significant interaction whereby directors
with ASD maintained referential precedents with new matchers
more often than did neurotypical directors. Collectively these
represent a range of subtle but likely consequential differences in
conversation that should be more pronounced in the context of
real-life situations that are less predictable than this game.
We take these findings to indicate that adults with ASD
have qualitatively typical patterns of basic lexical entrainment
(as reported by Slocombe et al., 2013, for familiar, lexicalized
stimuli), but take longer in this process. This global resemblance
is offset by multifaceted differences in partner-specific aspects
of reference, driven by a subgroup of participants with ASD.
Interestingly, differences surfaced in two ways: a minority
(4/13) of directors with ASD continued to maintain referential
precedents when speaking to a new matcher who did not share
history with it, while the majority of directors with ASD (9/13)
made their descriptions more informative like neurotypical
directors, but experienced delays in doing so. It seems that
only the minority did not take notice of the new matcher’s
lack of common ground with the referential precedent, while
the majority did notice but struggled to produce a description
appropriate for their addressee.
We now return to the question of mechanisms that give rise
to partner-specific effects in the use of referential pacts, and
the debate between “cooperative” views where considerations of
common ground guide language use (Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs,
1986; Brennan and Clark, 1996; Metzing and Brennan, 2003;
Brown-Schmidt, 2009) and low-level priming and encoding cue
views where initial stages of language processing are independent
of considerations of common ground (Horton and Gerrig, 2005;
Kronmüller and Barr, 2007; Shintel and Keysar, 2007). Our
study was not designed to address this debate, but we did
find partner-specific effects on production at the first point
possible (Round 4) after common ground was manipulated,
consistently in neurotypical adults and in the majority of adults
with ASD we tested. It is likely that both types of mechanisms
are deployed in language use, simultaneously, in a graded fashion
depending on a range of relevant factors including the strength
of communicative goals, amount of cognitive load, and nature
of stimuli (i.e., how entrenched linguistic forms are), (Brennan
and Hanna, 2009; Branigan et al., 2011), in line with constraint-
based models of language processing (MacDonald et al., 1994;
Trueswell and Tanenhaus, 1994). The production paradigm we
used pulls for cooperation, or at least mutually comprehensible
reference, as there was no default way to describe the figures so
descriptions were formulated over time through interaction (see
excerpts above). Unlike comprehension studies using familiar,
lexicalized stimuli where partner-specific effects can be explained
by an expectation for speakers to be referentially consistent
(e.g., Shintel and Keysar, 2007), it is difficult to imagine an
explanation of our findings that does not entail considerations
of the knowledge of the common ground available to the
matcher.
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A limitation of our study is its small sample size which
resulted in some medium size effects not reaching significance.
This is balanced by strengths in the rigorous matching of
participants across groups and time intensive transcription and
detailed coding required for task examining the evolution in
production of lexical descriptions over time in a collaborative
task. We investigated lexical entrainment between participants
and experimental confederates given the logistical constraints of
the partner manipulation, among others; an important direction
for future work will be to examine lexical entrainment in
ASD with naïve participants in both roles, as recommended by
Kuhlen and Brennan (2013). Finally, we focused primarily on
the director’s contributions in this dyadic task; there remain
many aspects of the matcher’s influence on entrainment to
be investigated. Matchers in this task were blind to the
hypotheses of the study but not necessarily to group status,
which may have become apparent through interaction, though
it was not face to face. This gives rise to the possibility
that confederate matchers may have engaged in audience
design and communicative scaffolding, related to evaluations of
the communicative competence (Bortfeld and Brennan, 1997;
Branigan et al., 2011) of directors with ASD, which in turn
contributed to some of the similarities observed between groups.
Though possible we find this unlikely as the confederates were
matchers in this game, as opposed to directors who took the
lead in formulating descriptions, and the matcher had genuine
informational needs as the terms used to describe the complex
novel figures were highly idiosyncratic.
Crucially, this first investigation of partner-specific referential
pacts in ASD resulted in a complex pattern of results that does
not support a categorically impaired theory of mind account. The
current findings reflect the communicative capacities of adults
with ASD who do not have language or intellectual impairment;
more pronounced group differences would be expected in
children and more representative samples including individuals
with ASD who have language and intellectual delays. Future
work should explore the nature of two different patterns of
partner-specific effects observed here in adults with ASD: not
modifying descriptions in the presence of a new matcher who
did not share common ground in a minority of participants, and
adapting descriptions but this entailing a delay in the majority
of participants. Further investigation is needed to examine the
impact these relatively subtle differences on communication in
the lives of people with ASD, including how they are perceived by
various conversational partners.
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